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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries to Darren J.
Pollick, resulting from a fall over a bannister surrounding
a stairwell in the J. C. Penney Store located at 4849 South
State Street, Murray, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Marcellus K.
Snow, sitting with a jury. From a verdict and judgment
for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.

2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of May 5, 1964, John R. Pollick went
to the J. C. Penney store at 4849 South State Street, Murray, Utah to purchase a Mother's Day gift (R. 122). He
took his three-year-old son, Darren Pollick, with him to
the store (R. 123). Mr. Pollick had been in the store a
number of prior occasions (R. 133). He had taken his son
shopping with him before (R. 123). Mr. Pollick knew there
were stairs from the main floor to the basement floor
(R. 134).

Mr. Pollick shopped for five or ten minutes before he
found a dress he wanted to buy (R. 125). Mr. Pollick had
Darren "in hand" most of the time while he was shopping
(R. 125). The saleslady proceeded to write up the charge
ticket and put the dress in a box (R. 126). While Mr. Pollick was checking the sales slip and signing it, Darren
walked away from him (R. 126). The next thing Mr. Pollick heard was crying, screaming and commotion coming
from the center of the store (R. 127). Mr. Pollick walked
toward the stair casing and saw Mr. Barlocker, a Penney
employee, carrying Darren up the stairs (R. 128). Although no one saw Darren fall, it is assumed that he climbed
over the bannister surrounding the stairwell and fell eleven
feet to a display table on the basement floor (R. 129, 152).
Darren suffered a broken leg from the fall (R. 114).
The evidence presented in the lower court indicates the
bannister over which Darren fell was a fraction under 36
inches in height (R. 154) and had a mop board around the
bottom that was 7% inches high and % inch wide at its
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top (R 154). At the time of the accident the boy was shortin hci, ht than the waist of his 5 foot 8 inch father

tX

139).

A Mr. Lloyd M. Dalton, building inspector for Murray
City, testified that the City had adopted the Uniform Building Code. He testified the code required the bannister around
the stairs in the Penney store should be 86 inches in height
( R. 173). This testimony was uncontroverted. He also testified there was nothing in the building code regarding mop
boards (R. 176). The defendant attempted to introduce evidence from Mr. Barlocker that from 1961 to 1964, while
he worked in the store, no one had fallen over the bannister
(R. 155). The court sustained plaintiff's objection to the
e\'idence (R. 160).
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendant
moved the court for a directed verdict (R. 157). The court
denied the motion (R. 169). The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff and against defendant awarding special damages of $821.36 and general damages of $2500.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT.
During the course of the trial the defendant moved for
a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had produced no competent evidence from which the jury could
find any negligence on behalf of the defendant, and that
the evidence taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff
showed that the plaintiff's minor son walked away from
his father while he was making a purchase, climbed over
a bannister and fell to the basement below (R. 157). The
court denied the defendant's motion (R. 160).
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Appellant contends that its motion for a directed 'Verdict should have been gra.nted.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record that
would indicate that the appellant was negligent in any
manner whatsoever. There was no evidence to show that
the bannister was negligently designed or constructed.
There was no evidence from which the jury could find the
mop board was improperly constructed. The evidence clearly indicates that the bannister was within a fraction of an
inch of being 3 feet in height as required by the building code (R. 154). Since there was no evidence relating to
the design or construction of mop boards, it must be presumed that they \Vere constructed properly. The burden of
proof was on the plaintiff to prove the defendant's negligence. A finding of negligence cannot be based on speculation or conjecture.
See Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986
(1954) where this court held:

"The burden was upon plaintiff to prove the
charge of speeding; such a finding of fact could not
be based on mere speculation or conjecture, but only
on a preponderance of the evidence. This means the
greater weight of the evidence, or as sometimes
stated, such degree of proof that the greater probability of truth lies therein. A choice of probabilities
does not meet this requirement. It creates only a basis
for co11,iecture, on which a verdict of the jury cannot
stand . .,_ " *" (Emphasis added)
It is elementary that before a person can recover from
another for injuries suffered, the one from whom the
damages are sought must be shown to have been negligent
and further such negligence must be shown to have been
the cause of the injury.

In Mortensen v. First Security Bank of Utah, 12 Utah
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2d
363 P.2d 75 ( 1961), the plaintiff had the tip of
her thumb cut off while making a deposit in the bank's
night depository. The jury found for the plaintiff, but
the court granted defendant's motion for judgment N.O.V.
In upholding the ruling of the trial court judge, Justice
Crockett stated:
"It is not doubted that the plaintiff injured her
thumb, nor that it was both painful and unfortunate.
But that provides no basis for making another pay for
it. It is so elementary as to hardly require exposition
that this can be done only if the defendant was at fault
in causing the injury. Before plaintiff could recover
she had the burden of showing that the defendant was
guilty of negligence: that is, that by some act or omission it failed in its duty to use reasonable care for the
safety of persons in plaintiff's situation and thereby
exposed them to an unreasonable risk of harm." Mortrnsen at 77. (Emphasis added)

This court has held that a verdict cannot stand unless
it is supported by the evidence. In Larson v. Evans, 12
Utah 2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088 (1961), plaintiff brought suit
for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. At the
trial the judge instructed the jury that the defendant was
negligent as a matter of law for running a stop sign. The
jury was then instructed that they might find that the
plaintiffs were contributorily negligent. The plaintiff
appealed from a jury verdict of no cause of action and the
denial of a motion for a new trial.

This court held there was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding of contributory negligence and reversed the
lower court judgment.
Generally speaking appellate courts are reluctant to
overturn jury verdicts. However, under certain circumstances, such verdicts will be overturned.
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"The rnle that a verdict will not br distuJ'iJrd 111herc
c1·idP11cr tends to s11m1ort it docs 11ot cnil>i'O('C 0
rnsc wit Ne a I'Ndict has been rendered i;1 fo ror of
plc1i11tiff in a11 act,.on a11d the record shows rrn e11tirr
al1se11ce of evidc11('e s11;morti11r1. or te11di11g to s111n·o1·t.
so111e material and iJ1disJJC11sable fart 1iercssa1·11 to be
proved /J!f him to j11stif!f the 1·c11ditio11 of a ve1·dict in
his frr ?'m·.
tl1r

"F11rthe1· it has been held that, where the ·verdict
is mrr11if cstlu a,q01"11st the evidence, the .iudpme11t will br
reversed 11otwithsta11di11g the trial court had refused
to set aside the 11crdfrt. So also the ve1·dict or findings
will not be permitted to stand where they arc directly contradictorr of, or irreconcilable with, the ;,, idence 01· rest only on speculation and conjecture; or
where the verdict is unsupported by the evidence; and
a similar rule applies where the verdict is not support2d
or sustained by substantial evidence, or by any evidence, or is not sustained by any reasonable hypothesis based on the facts proved; or where the evidence is clearly insufficient as a matter of law." 5A
C.J.S. Appeal & Error, Sec. 1647 (1958) (Emphasis
added).
The uncontroverted evidence shows that the bannister
was constructed in accordance with the Uniform Building
Code.
The defendant called as a witness Mr. Lloyd M. Dalton, \vho is a building inspector for Murray City (R. 170).
Mr. Dalton testified that the building code required bannisters of the type found in the appellant's store to be 36
inches in height ( R. 17 4). He further testified that there
is nothing in the code with regard to mop boards (R. 176).
From Mr. Dalton's testimony it was clear that Penney's
had complied in every respect with the building code.
The plaintiff did not produce one shred of evidence to
contradict or impeach this evidence.
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This court has consistently held that findings against
:·c>\"(·rted and unimpeached evidence will be set aside.
Jn Po1 b·1 ?'. Weber County In. Dist., 68 Utah 472, 251
P. 11 ( 1926), plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant
irrigation district on a written contract. The lower court
rendered judgment for plaintiff, notwithstanding testimon:.· by three witnesses to the effect that plaintiff knew
ancl agreed that his contract should not commence until
defendant district obtained a loan. The loan was never
ribtained.
,1 ;1,·cq,:

This court reversed the trial court finding for the
plaintiff, and noted, with regard to the uncontroverted
tPstimony of the witnesses:
"The witnesses were not impeached nor their
testimony in any particular discredited or contradicted
or impaired. The court thus was not at liberty to disregard it and make a finding contrary thereto, which
in effect was done by finding that there was no such
agreement or understanding as testified to by the
witnesses. In other words, the district by undisputed
evidence proved what this court on the first appeal
said was a complete defense to plaintiff's cause, but
the court by its finding disregarded such evidence and
found contrary thereto; and hence it follows that the
finding must be set aside and the judgment based upon
it vacated." Parker at 13.
In the case of American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 120
Utah 402, 235 P.2d 361 ( 1951), this court adopted the rule
from another court:
"The general rule as to the effect of positive uncontradicted evidence is found in National Bank of
Commerce of N. Y. v. Bottolfson, 55 S.D. 196, 225
N.W. 385, 386, 69 A.L.R. 892, wherein the court said:

"Where the testimony of a witness is uncontradicted
and not inherently improbable, and there are no circumstances tending to raise a doubt of its truth, the
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facts so prnven should be taken as conclusively estaulished and verdict directed or decision entel'ed accordingly." American Scale at 364. (Emphasis added)

The testimony of Lloyd M. Dalton was uncontroverted.
The plaintiff not only failed to show that the bannister did
not comply with the building code, but also introduced no
testimony that would even imply that the bannister was
negligently designed or constructed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING INDIRECTLY INTO EVIDENCE THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT MADE REPAIRS TO THE BANNISTER
SUBSEQUENT TO THE ACCIDENT.
In March of 1966, two years after the accident, the
defendant installed a wrought-iron addition to the bannister over which Darren fell. The addition increased the
height of the bannister by approximately 17 inches (R. 168).
Before the trial began, counsel and the court agreed that
evidence of such repairs was inadmissible (R. 168). However, during the cross-examination of Mr. Dennis Barlocker the plaintiff's attorney asked several times whether
or not an extension could have been added to the bannister
to prevent people from falling over it (R. 166). Defendant made a timely objection to this testimony (R. 170).

The defendant contends that by allowing plaintiff to
ask such questions, it put into evidence indirectly the fact
that the defendant had put an extension on the bannister.
Such questions were highly prejudicial and deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. These questions accomplished
indirectly the very thing that plaintiff's counsel admitted
was contrary to law (R. 169).
The rule of admissibility as to repairs that is followed
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in the great majority of jurisdictions including Utah is
well stated in Rule 51 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
'\Vhen after the occurrence of an event remedial
or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken
previously would have tended to make the event less
likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
There are two persuasive reasons for this rule of evidence. One is that because repairs are made, it does not
follow that the condition was defective at the time of the
accident. The other reason is that if such evidence were
admitted, it would have a tendency to cause employers to
omit making needed repairs for fear that the· precaution
thus taken by them could be used as evidence against them.
This court followed the general rule in the case of Potter v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hospital, 99

Utah 71, 103 P.2d 280 (1940). Here suit was brought for
the death of a hospital patient after she had fallen from
her bed. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital was negligent in not having sideboards on the patient's bed. This
court held that the trial court should have granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence in
the record failed to show negligence on the part of the
defendant.
After the accident sideboards were placed on the
patient's bed. Plaintiffs asserted that due care required
the hospital to use sideboards before the fall. To this
contention the court stated:
"Evidence of alterations or repairs to premises
under his control made following an accident therein
is inadmissible to show as against a defendant that
the former condition was unsafe or was being negligently maintained." Potter at 282.
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See also Christensen v. Utah Rapid Tra1rnic Co., 83
Utah 231, 27 P.2d 468 ( 1933), where this court said:
"It is the gene!·al rule that where a dang2rous or
defective appliance is alleged to have resulted in an
injury for which damages are sought to be recovered,
evidence that subsequent to the accident rha11qPs oi·
repairs thereof or the1·eto were madr is i11ndmissih/p
to show antecedent neqligence or as an admission of
neg liq en re on the pm ·tiru ln r ocrasio11 in q 11esfio u, although such evidence may be admissible for other nnrposes." Christensen at 474. (Emphasis

While it is true that plaintiff did not specifically ask
defendant's floor manager whether repairs had been made
subsequent to the accident, the questions that were asked
of Mr. Barlocker were equally prejudicial and produced
the same effect. Mr. Barlocker \Vas asked three times by
the plaintiff whether or not an extension could have been
added to the bannister (R. 165, 166). The plaintiff made
reference in his questions to the very type of extension
that had in fact been added to the bannister.
The questioning that took place on the part of the
plaintiff was designed to introduce into evidence indirectly
that which could not be introduced in Utah by direct evidence. Such a tactic violates public policy in that it has the
effect of discouraging a defendant from repairing or altering a condition that may cause another accident whether
the defendant was quilty of negligence in the first instance
or not.

In Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.
2d 120 (6th Cir., 1955), the airline brought action against
the aircraft manufacturer for alleged negligence in design
and manufacture of airplanes. In the trial court the plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence as to modifications
that defendant had made in the wing joint after the damage was discovered. The evidence was introduced to show
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how the wing should have been designed in the first place.

The evidence was not admitted, and the Circuit Court up-

held the lower court. The appellate court held that the result of admitting the evidence would have been to provide
a basis for inferring what should have been done. The
court said:
"This kind of hindsight evidence is not properly
admissible upon the issue of ordinary care." Northwest
at 130.
In the case of Triplett v. Napier, 286 S.W.2d 87 (Ky.

1955), the plaintiff was injured in a fall on defendant's

allegedly defective stairway. During depositions the plaintiff asked concerning subsequent repairs. Proper objections were made to these questions and answers which were
sustained by the trial court. However, notwithstanding
these objections, plaintiff on two separate occasions on
cross-examination questioned witnesses on repairs. Both
times objections were made and sustained. The appellate
court said that such questions were:

"* * * calculated to elicit answers from which the
jury could learn, or infer, that such repairs had been
made."
In ruling that such questions were prejudicial, the court
stated:

"Such conduct with resulting argument is the
evil sought to be avoided by the general rule, as is
pointed out in the Kentucky & West Virginia Power
Co. v. Stacy case. The continued and persistent efforts
of appellee's counsel to bring the matter of the repairs
to the attention of the jury after adverse rulings must
be considered as prejudicial." Triplett at 89-90.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S PROFFERED EVIDENCE.
During the direct examination of Mr. Dennis Barlocker, defendant asked the witness,
"During the time that you have worked at the
store, did work at the store, from 1961 up until the
time of the accident, to your knowledge had there been
any children or other people that had fallen over that
stairs?" ( R. 155)
Before the witness could answer, the plaintiff objected
to the question as immaterial. Defendant then argued the
point both in court and in chambers citing to the court the
case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 232
P.2d 210 ( 1951) ( R. 155). After hearing argument the
court sustained plaintiff's objection (R. 160).
Defendant respectfully submits that the ruling of the
trial court was prejudicial error.
Defendant should have been allowed to introduce evidence of the absence of prior accidents for two critical, independent reasons. In the first place such testimony would
be evidence that the bannister was not a dangerous fixture
in defendant's store, and, in the second place, the testimony, if allowed, would have shown that the defendant had
no notice of the allegedly dangerous condition. Such testimony was critical to the defendant's case, and under Utah
law should clearly have been admitted.
In the case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., supra,
the plaintiff sued the drug store for injuries suffered in a
fall on a wet terrazzo floor in the entrance of the store.
During the course of the trial the defendant attempted to
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introduce evidence that approximately 4,000 to 5,000 perentered the drug store every day during the fifteen
year:-; µnor to the accident and during that period of time
the defendant had never received a single complaint or report about anyone slipping on the terrazzo slab. The trial
court excluded the testimony. This court held that such
exclusion was error. In so holding the court said:
"Evidence of the absence of accidents occurring
prior to the accident complained of may not be admissible to establish that an unsafe condition did not
exist at the time of the accident in question. That
matter we need not decide here. But such evidence is
clearly admissible to prove that a possessor of l,and
had no knowledge nor could he be charged with knowlPd.qe that unsafe condition existed, particularly when
the unsafe condition complained of is latent. In the
instant case the appellant can only be liable if the
terrazzo floor when wet subjected business visitors
to an unreasonable risk and the appellant either knew
or by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered that such a condition existed. Evidence that
thousands of business visitors had walked through the
entranceway in all kinds of weather and that none of
them had ever complained to the appellant of slipping
on the terrazzo slab, while not conclusive on the question, as heretofore pointed out, does have probative
value upon the question whether the appellant knew
or should have known of the existence of an unreasonable risk to customers entering and leaving the store."
El'ickson at 214. (Emphasis added)
The fact that there were no prior accidents involving
the stairs or bannister was a circumstance that should have
been considered by the jury in determining whether the
bannister was dangerous and whether the defendant had
any notice of a dangerous condition.
The facts of the instant case and the Erickson case are
very similar. In each case the defendant was a retail store
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with the same legal obligations toward their cm.tomers.
In both cases the dangerous condition, if one existed, was
latent. In both cases the element of notice of a dangerous
condition was an important element of the case. It is
submitted that the Erickson case is controlling law in this
case, and that the defendant should have been allowed to
present evidence as to the absence of prior accidents.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court
erred in failing to grant its motion for a directed verdict.
The trial court also committed prejudicial error in allowing indirectly into evidence the fact that alterations had
been made to the bannister and in not permitting defendant
to introduce evidence showing the absence of prior accidents. If this court does not grant defendant's motion for
a directed verdict, it should grant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER, Esq.
M. JOHN ASHTON, Esq.
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

